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ABSTRACT 
Secure land rights are a critical, but often overlooked, factor in achieving household food security and 
improved nutritional status in rural areas of developing countries. This study evaluates the impact of 
India’s land-allocation and registration program in West Bengal, a program that targets poor populations 
and promotes the inclusion of women’s names on land titles. We use mixed methods data collected 
between 2010 and 2012 to examine the program’s selection of beneficiaries and a set of outcomes that are 
expected to lay the foundation for future food security, as well as short-term food security indicators. Our 
results indicate that the program’s implementation at the block level allowed for considerable variation in 
the processes used to select beneficiaries, to demarcate plots, to distribute titles and to provide 
infrastructure support. Although we were unable to detect statistically significant program effects on 
current household food security, we find that the land-allocation and registration program has had an 
impact on a range of outcomes that are expected to lead to future food security: beneficiary households 
report stronger security, and they are more likely to take loans for agricultural purposes, to invest in 
agricultural improvements, and to involve women when making decisions related to food and agriculture. 
These effects vary with plot size—larger plots lead to larger benefits—and depend on whose names are 
included on the land documents; the effects are larger if women’s names are recorded on the land titles. 
Keywords: food security, gender, land rights, intrahousehold dynamics, West Bengal, India 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite rapid economic gains over the last decade, India continues to struggle with hunger and 
undernutrition. India is home to the largest number of malnourished children in the world, and its Global 
Hunger Index score has stagnated for the past 17 years in spite of a concurrent near doubling of its gross 
national income (von Grebmer et al. 2012). The Indian paradox, whereby high levels of hunger persist 
despite solid state-level economic performance, holds true in West Bengal, a state that, with an 18.5 
percent prevalence of undernourishment, 38.5 percent of children under five underweight, and a 5.9 
percent under-five mortality rate, ranks eighth among the 17 Indian states in the State Hunger Index 
(Menon, Deolalikar, and Bhaskar 2009). 
This lack of significant progress on food security is not for want of effort. National and state 
governments have implemented various public programs with mixed results, underscoring the complexity 
of India’s food security situation (Deaton and Drèze 2009). The Public Distribution Program, for 
example, is a massive government intervention that distributes staples to India’s poor through Fair Price 
Shops. Although implementation varies by state, in most cases, the Public Distribution Program is a 
perennial political target for its various failings and abuses, such as black marketing of foodstuffs, ghost 
ration cards, distribution of inferior quality goods, and misidentification of beneficiaries (Food 
Corporation of India 2010). The Integrated Child Development Services and the Mid-Day Meal are two 
national initiatives targeted at children’s food security, the former for children under the age of six and the 
latter for all children in primary school. A recent evaluation of the Integrated Child Development Services 
food supplement found 65.8 percent effective coverage rate (India, Programme Evaluation Organisation,  
2011) and the most recent work plan from the northeastern state of West Bengal acknowledged that the 
Mid-Day Meal  program implementation varied greatly in quality by administrative area (India, Ministry 
of Human Resource Development 2011).   
In parallel to a number of food distribution programs, state governments have invested 
considerable efforts on a wide range of training and asset-based interventions meant to improve food 
security by decreasing poverty and improving livelihoods. In rural communities, the menu of 
interventions often includes programs that allocate or regularize homestead land, such as the Nijo Griha, 
Nijo Bhumi (NGNB) program, which is the immediate successor to a related homestead allocation 
program launched in 2006 under another name by the Department of Land and Land Reform in West 
Bengal.
1
 According to the Indian National Sample Survey Organization’s 2004 report, 427,000 
households in the state were landless and homesteadless. Under the program, the government purchases 
tracts of land and provides microplots, only a fraction of an acre in size, to landless rural families. The 
microplots are intended for building a homestead, cultivating a small vegetable garden, planting fruit and 
wood trees, and raising livestock. These plots, documented with pattas (land titles) issued by the state, are 
expected to enhance families’ ability to access government services, agricultural inputs, and financial 
resources, thereby enhancing families’ income, reducing their vulnerability, and improving their food 
security. Recognizing the pervasive additional constraints that women often face in accessing economic 
resources and acknowledging the key role women can play in their households’ well-being, NGNB 
explicitly stipulates that pattas issued to dual-headed households should be issued in the woman’s name 
only or jointly titled to the male and female heads. 
Landesa, a nongovernmental organization focused on land legislation and programming among 
poor populations, has provided technical support to the Department of Land and Land Reform since 2009 
to pilot changes to the NGNB program (and, earlier, the Cultivation and Dwelling Plot Allotment 
Scheme), identify best practices, and facilitate scaling it up to reach 100,000 households. In addition, and 
as part of an umbrella initiative to study the gender gap in asset ownership, Landesa has partnered with 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to evaluate this land-allocation program. This 
paper evaluating linkages between homestead allocation and food security is a result of this collaboration.  
                                                     
1 The earlier program was known as the Cultivation and Dwelling Plot Allotment Scheme. 
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This study is particularly timely, given that the Government of India has recently promulgated a 
food security ordinance concerned with household-level food security that will soon be considered by 
Parliament; that the Government of India has to craft and approve its 13th Five Year Plan, which is bound 
to propose avenues for enhancing these same outcomes; that the Government of India is committed to 
passing a national rural homestead bill entitling landless households in rural areas to a homestead plot of 
10 decimals; that India’s minister of Rural Development has recently signed an agreement to fund state-
level land-allocation programs; and that India’s civil society is playing a critical role in advocating and 
monitoring for inclusive land rights.  
Using mixed methods data collected between 2010 and 2012, we explore three sets of questions. 
We start by briefly examining who becomes a beneficiary of the NGNB program, drawing on key 
informant interviews with government officials involved in the process at all administrative levels from 
village to district and on interviews with the beneficiaries themselves. We then assess program outcomes 
such as household tenure security, household agricultural investments, and women’s involvement in food 
and agriculture decisionmaking—outcomes that when enhanced are expected to lead to increased 
household production and long-term food security. Lastly, we examine whether the NGNB program has 
already yielded some of its expected long-term food security benefits by considering households’ 
vulnerability to hunger, their dietary diversity, their protein consumption, and how food is distributed 
within the household. 
Our results indicate that the program’s implementation at the block level allowed for considerable 
variation in the processes used to select beneficiaries, to demarcate plots, to distribute titles, and to 
provide infrastructure support. Compared to eligible nonbeneficiary households, we find that NGNB 
households are significantly more likely to have improved intermediate outcomes, including reports of 
tenure security, use of credit for agriculture, investments on improved agricultural inputs, and women’s 
decisionmaking over household food and agriculture. We find that the size of the plots matters and that 
the inclusion of women on titles is instrumental in achieving these improved outcomes. Although these 
results are very encouraging and expected to improve future food security, we found no evidence of 
significant improvement in current food security among beneficiary households. Our study finds results 
similar to those of Li, Rozelle, and Brandt (1998), with tenure security having an impact on longer time 
horizon investments, and empirically shows the gendered link between land-tenure security and a number 
of agricultural inputs and outcomes.   
In the following sections, we describe why and how agricultural production and tenure security 
relate to food security more generally and provide context with brief descriptions of the land situation in 
West Bengal and the NGNB program. We describe the data collection, methodological approach, and key 
indicators used in the analysis. We then use qualitative data to portray the process by which the NGNB 
program selected beneficiary households and rely on quantitative analysis to test NGNB’s impact on 
households’ pathways to future food security (intermediate outcomes) as well as their current food 
security status. We conclude with a discussion of results, recommendations for land and food policy, and 
suggestions for further research. 
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2.  FOOD SECURITY AND LINKAGES WITH LAND AND AGRICULTURE 
At the World Food Summit in 1996, it was agreed that “food security exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” Food security thus comprises three so-called pillars: 
food availability, food access, and food use (Quisumbing et al. 1995). Food availability requires that 
enough food of adequate quality is produced, purchased, or received on a consistent basis. Food access 
requires having the economic, social, or political means to obtain nutritious food on a continuous basis. 
Food use refers to the knowledge and complementary conditions required to appropriately consume food 
that meets nutritional needs. This extends to issues such as sanitation, food preparation, healthcare, and 
water safety. These pillars are applicable from the global level to each individual within a household. 
Thus each unit of aggregation—a nation, a region, a household, an individual—is considered food secure 
only if its food availability, access, and use requirements are met.  
Agricultural advancements in more nutritious crops and improved yields have the potential to 
secure the availability of a larger supply of more affordable, healthier food. Studies such as those by Li, 
Rozelle, and Brandt (1998) and Deininger et al. (2008) explored direct links between land-rights security 
and agricultural production, finding that land-rights security will positively affect long-term land saving 
investments and induce new investment in land, which leads to higher production. Studies by 
Kyomugisha (2008), Deininger (2003), and Besley (1995) looked at linkages between land-rights security 
and factors such as access to credit and technology adoption that are hypothesized to improve agricultural 
production, finding that land security is an important aspect of these processes.  
However, food production is only one aspect of food security. Most of the rural poor in 
developing regions continue to experience difficulties accessing food due to poverty. Since their 
livelihood strategies tend to rely heavily, directly or indirectly, on agricultural activities, their income is 
more responsive to growth in the agricultural sector than in any other sector (Ligon and Sadoulet 2011; 
Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl 2011). This argument for supporting smallholder-inclusive agricultural 
investment seems particularly relevant in the context of India, where remarkable economic growth at the 
national level has not trickled down to the rural poor (FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012).  
Furthermore, there has been increasing, yet far from sufficient, acknowledgment that gender 
differences, social norms, and intrahousehold dynamics can affect whether and to what extent 
households’ rights to land affect food security. The literature suggests that reducing the gender gap by 
enhancing women’s control over resources can yield increases in agricultural production (Quisumbing 
1996; Allendorf 2007; Fletschner 2008) and that, compared with men’s income, women’s income has a 
greater effect on their households’ calorie consumption, on the share of the family budget allocated to 
staples, on food expenditures, on children’s weight-for-height, and on preschoolers’ weight-for-age 
(Quisumbing et al. 1995).  
When it comes to land, it is often assumed that strengthening women’s rights to land can improve 
their ability to exercise control over those plots, can enhance women’s tenure security, and can strengthen 
their position within their households, giving them the power to influence how resources are allocated, 
what is produced, and who consumes what. Unfortunately, robust evidence to support the latter is still 
scarce,2 and as national, regional, and global actors prioritize efforts to reduce hunger and undernutrition, 
there is a growing demand for robust, nuanced, and gender-sensitive evidence informed by intrahousehold 
dynamics on the links between land tenure and food security. It is within this context that we chose to 
examine whether and to what extent the NGNB land-allocation program is poised to improve the food 
security of its beneficiaries. The links we examine are depicted in Figure 2.1. We start by exploring 
NGNB effects on a host of important intermediate food security outcomes such as households’ and 
                                                     
2 Important exceptions include Goldstein and Udry (2006), Allendorf (2007), Katz and Chamorro (2002), and Quisumbing 
and Maluccio (2003). 
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women’s perceptions of tenure security3: households’ access to financial resources; households’ 
agricultural investments and practices
4: and women’s participation in food and agriculture 
decisionmaking. These outcomes are considered intermediate because they are expected to impact a 
household’s future food security. Although we realize that statistically observable improvements in food 
security may take more time to materialize, we also run preliminary analysis to assess NGNB effects on 
households’ vulnerability to hunger, their dietary diversity, their consumption of proteins, and 
intrahousehold patterns of food distribution. 
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized linkages between NGNB and food security  
 
Source:  Conceptual framework developed by the authors. 
Before we proceed with the analysis, we provide a brief overview of key features of the NGNB 
program and the context in which it operates. 
                                                     
3 Studies from India have found evidence that owner-cultivated land and land under secure tenure arrangements tend to be 
the most agriculturally productive (Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak 2002; Shaban 1987). 
4 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) link different historical tenure systems to technology adoption, including fertilizer use, and find a 
resulting legacy of differences whereby landlord-controlled areas were less productive than areas where land was owned by the 
tillers. 
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3. WEST BENGAL AND THE NIJO GRIHA, NIJO BHUMI PROGRAM 
In West Bengal’s precolonial period, land was administrated by zamindars, a class of Indian aristocratic 
landlords, and worked by rent-paying cultivators. The zamindar system was characterized by a series of 
intermediaries responsible for tax collection, and this hierarchy was preserved when the British instated 
the zamindars as the land proprietors under their Permanent Settlement. Two important legacies of the 
colonial period were increasing layers of rent-collecting intermediaries and an emergence of a new class 
of wealthy landholders, jotedars, who were able to claim large tracts of land outside of the British 
Permanent Settlement. These factors caused much peasant unrest, which set the trajectory for West 
Bengal’s post-independence land reforms (Hanstad and Brown 2001; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2003).  
West Bengal is widely recognized as one of the most progressive states in redistributive land 
reform, and one of the more successful implementers of national-level land to the tiller efforts. Behind 
this success are the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and the strong political will to implement its 
provisions. Beginning in 1978, the Marxist Left Front–led government launched Operation Barga, a 
statewide effort to document and enumerate West Bengal’s bargadars (sharecroppers), thus providing 
them with greater tenure security under the law. West Bengal was also at the fore among states in terms of 
effective distribution of ceiling-surplus land,
5
 having taken control of and allocated 1.04 million acres by 
2001 (Hanstad and Brown 2001). These redistribution efforts did not explicitly confer rights upon 
individual women in married households, assuming their interests were subsumed under the household. 
Only decades later would the West Bengal government adopt an explicit policy of joint titling when 
allocating land under these acts (Brown and Das Chowdhury 2003). 
The Government of West Bengal launched the homestead allocation program in 2006 (amended 
in 2009 and then renamed Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi
6
 in 2011) to provide land for the poorest landless and 
homesteadless agricultural-laborer households. The NGNB program is mainly implemented by the 
Department of Land and Land Reforms, with major roles for the Block Development Office and 
Panchayati Raj Institutions. West Bengal’s land policy is notable for allowing the government to purchase 
land for redistribution in addition to reallocating vested ceiling surplus land. The program established a 
Land Purchase and Land Distribution Committee at the block administrative level, responsible for finding 
large tracts of land available for purchase at government-defined rates. This committee solicited a list of 
recommended eligible families from pradhans, or heads of the local gram panchayat (village-level 
government). Eligible families were defined as those that relied on daily agricultural wage labor, food 
gathering from common property, or menial labor, and that lived below the poverty line. Households were 
then selected in order of priority, where priority was given to agricultural-laborer and rural-artisan 
households that have been landless for two generations, women-headed households, and households 
having only daughters and no sons. The selected families were then relocated in clusters to those 
purchased tracts of land on household plots of 10 to 16 decimals (a decimal = 1/100 acre). In some cases, 
the Block Development Office and the Panchayati Raj Institutions then supported the cluster with 
additional infrastructure, housing programs, and agricultural extension services. The land documents were 
to be issued in the woman’s name only or jointly with the woman’s name first for married couples. Land 
issued through this program was restricted from alienation, sharecropping, or the use of hired labor (West 
Bengal 2006). After the pivotal 2011 elections, the State Government of West Bengal under the new 
Trinamul Congress leadership relaunched the homestead allocation program as the NGNB program with a 
revised parcel size of a maximum of 5 decimals. 
                                                     
5 Land-ceiling laws are a key legislative tool in Indian land reform. In principle, land in excess of the legislated ceiling (6 to 
7 standard acres, depending on family size in West Bengal) is vested by the government and redistributed to the landless 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009).  
6 This translates to “My Home, My Land.” 
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4.  PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
Qualitative information provides important context and helps understand the process by which NGNB 
selected beneficiary households and the factors that influenced how land was allocated. We gathered this 
data in the postmonsoon season, September and October 2012, one to two years after beneficiaries 
received patta. We conducted 12 key informant interviews with implementers of the NGNB program to 
acquire a better understanding of its processes and how it has been implemented; 11 life-history 
interviews with beneficiaries to gather insights into possible changes to food security at the household and 
individual levels; and 8 focus-group discussions to obtain a view of community-level norms about 
landownership and use, as well as how food is allocated within families. Participants for the qualitative 
work were purposefully sampled from one district, Coochbehar, to gain an in-depth perspective in a 
specific locality. Key informant interviews were sampled to include perspectives from all levels of 
implementation, from the village to the district administrative level. For the life histories and focus-group 
discussions, we purposefully selected representatives of diverse demographic categories, such as single 
women, Muslims, and Scheduled Castes. Categorizations of interviews and focus-group discussions 
conducted are detailed in Appendix Table A.1.
7
 We analyzed the resulting data with NVivo, using 
NGNB’s published guidelines as the framework for our deductive analysis of program implementation as 
we identified cases of adherence to or deviations from these prescribed steps. We looked for underlying 
patterns in program implementation by matching these cases with the geographic and demographic data 
we had collected. 
The qualitative information we gathered strongly suggests that at a more local level, the pradhans 
and the gram panchayats played a critical role in the selection of NGNB beneficiaries. Block-level 
officers relied on the gram panchayats’ local knowledge to compile a list of potential beneficiaries, which 
was later verified. The opinion of higher-level administrative officials was that only the active pradhans 
took the necessary initiative to participate in NGNB and help identify land and beneficiaries. These 
officers would comment that it was not possible to implement the program properly without cooperation 
from the gram panchayats. Given the key role the pradhans played, it is important to note that even the 
more active ones differ in the process they followed to create the list of potential beneficiaries. For 
example, one pradhan said that he consulted widely with other political leaders and schoolteachers to 
identify the landless, and others held community meetings based on the existing government Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act list.
8
 
A portion of beneficiaries indicated some degree of self-selection onto beneficiary lists, although 
others said that they were unaware of the program until the gram panchayats notified them of their 
beneficiary status. However, there did not appear to be a clear pattern of self-selection at the gram 
panchayat level.
9
 
As soon as we learned that land will be distributed, we visited to them (the pradhan’s 
office) in a group to know who will be getting land. They went through the list and said 
that there are names of these eight families. Then we started pursuing the process 
because if we receive some land, we can plant some trees there. Our children are 
growing [and] we need some place to live there, therefore we pressured the pradhan to 
distribute the land. He also gave a time period and promised to give land within that 
time. He kept his promise and gave us patta, then we requested them to show us the plot. 
                                                     
7 The tools used for this study are available from the authors upon request. 
8 We did not hear reports of purely political decisions over the beneficiary lists in the four gram panchayats where we did 
the qualitative interviews. Results from our representative quantitative survey indicate that only 7.5 percent of the respondents 
who knew of the NGNB program reported that the program had not been implemented “fairly” in their village—although over 20 
percent mentioned that there had been disagreements in their village about who was included. 
9 Although the complex politics of the gram panchayat system, involving class and caste, are of relevance to this type of 
program, studying them is beyond the scope of our study. By design, our modest qualitative exploration focused on only four 
gram panchayats, which limits our ability to identify generalizable patterns. 
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Then they came here and showed us our plots.—Female head of household beneficiary, 
focus group 
Panchayat gave this land, I did not ask for it. I was in Assam at my son’s place there 
[when] I got the message that land is going to be allotted in our names and I have to be 
present that time. Nobody else could collect that on my behalf. Therefore I returned 
back.—Female head of household beneficiary, life history, age 60 
Prior to the program, most of the households participating in qualitative focus-group discussions 
were living with relatives. Tight quarters and family dynamics were a source of daily disputes and an 
uncomfortable living situation. In many cases, those cohabiting relatives were the primary source through 
which landless households learned of, and were motivated to apply for, the NGNB program.  
The verification and distribution of patta was also done at the block level. First, members of a 
land committee comprised of block-level development and land officers personally visited the identified 
households to verify their status. Block-level officers we interviewed indicated a difficult trade-off 
between reaching the largest number of beneficiaries and demarcating larger plots for fewer beneficiaries, 
and found themselves opting for including the maximum number of eligible beneficiaries. Personal safety 
and political reasons related to West Bengal’s history of land-related agitation were among the key 
motivating factors for appeasing the largest numbers of landless.  
Selecting beneficiaries was the most difficult work. There are many landless people here; 
selecting only few out of them on the basis of their needs was a difficult job. Moreover, 
there are many other issues, like politics. We need to come here from a distant place, and 
if by chance I get attacked by any mob, assistance from department will reach there after 
my death. Since the land availability is limited, we face such situations. If there would 
have been enough to distribute among all, then it would have been easier.—Revenue 
inspector, Key Informant Interview, age 56 
Other block-level officers decided that in peri-urban areas, beneficiaries do not need cultivable 
land beyond the footprint of a house—one Block Land officer recalled distributing one acre of peri-urban 
land among 50 beneficiaries, resulting in plots of 2 decimals each. These accounts suggest potential 
block-level differences in the criteria used to pare down the beneficiary list and consequently how much 
land was allocated. Land availability appears to be a major contributing factor in these decisions. Several 
block-level officers mentioned that the government rates for purchasing land to allocate to beneficiaries 
were too low compared to actual land market values in the area. Selling land to the government at those 
rates is spoken of by both beneficiaries and officials as a charitable transaction, not a regular market 
transaction.  
Once the final selection of beneficiaries was agreed upon, the actual plots were distributed 
according to a lottery. How pattas were distributed seemed to vary by location. In some cases, the pattas 
were distributed from the Block Development Office or gram panchayat office with little ceremony. In 
other cases, the respondents recalled a large function in their area with political speeches and distribution 
of tiffin, seeds, and saplings.  
On the day of lottery, there was a big function. Many people came here . . . They offered 
us tea and biscuits. They called our name on the mike, and we went there and picked up 
one chit [piece of paper] from the basket . . . On the next day, staffs from BLLRO [Block 
Land and Land Reforms Officer] came to do the land measurements and showed us 
which area belongs to us as per the lottery. They gave us Singara [snacks] on that day. 
—Married female beneficiary, focus group 
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5.  ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
Data 
We collected a quantitative baseline by interviewing NGNB households after they received their 
homestead plots and obtained their pattas but before they moved to their new plots. Because the 
implementation of NGNB is affected by monsoon rains between June and September, data collection for 
our baseline took place in two rounds: May–June of 2010 and January–June of 2011. We surveyed a 
sample of 1,373 households in three districts: Coochbehar, Bankura, and Jalpaiguri. Of these, 803 
households are NGNB beneficiaries, and the remaining 570 households serve as the control group. For 
the control group, we chose households who made it to the list of NGNB-eligible households but did not 
benefit from the program. Throughout this study, we use district-level survey weights to consider the 
population distribution of eligible NGNB beneficiaries and ensure that statistics computed from this 
sample are representative.  
The baseline survey targeted a head of household if available, with a subset of questions repeated 
for the female spouse if the identified head of household happened to be male. The instrument used 
included questions on demographics, schooling, housing condition, physical infrastructure, water and 
sanitation, participation in decisionmaking, income-generating activities, expenditures and debt, 
membership and participation in local social institutions, household food security, home garden 
cultivation, and livestock assets. 
We visited these households for a second time between October and November of 2012, this time 
targeting the interviews to the adult woman. We were unable to interview 338 of these women and had to 
replace their households because their entire household had migrated out of the block or because there 
was no adult female member in the house capable of answering most of our questions without the 
assistance of a man. At 24.62 percent, this relatively high attrition rate between the two surveys could cast 
doubts on the reliability of any inferences based on the second round of data. To rule out biases that could 
result from differential attrition, we conducted t-tests between the households in the full panel and those 
who attrited. We find no significant differences when looking at the food security outcomes of interest, 
but as the results included in Appendix Table A.2 indicate, the two samples differ in a few characteristics. 
Compared to those in the full sample, attriting households were more common in Coochbehar, where out-
migration is high; men from attriting households were younger and less likely to be married, 
characteristics that make them more likely to out-migrate; and female respondents from attriting 
households were slightly more educated. To further test whether attrition is random, we ran an attrition 
probit. We found that caste, household size, religion, and district are significant predictors of attrition. 
(See Appendix Table A.3 for the attrition probit results.) Although the model explains 14 percent of the 
attrition, we chose not to rely on it to adjust for attrition in the rest of the analysis because missing 
information for some of the explanatory variables used would reduce our sample size considerably, and 
earlier studies on selectivity in attrition suggest that attrition will not be a severe problem for obtaining 
consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest for this study (Alderman et al. 2000). Still, we note the 
need for caution in interpreting our results. 
Balancing Treatment and Control Groups 
After eliminating attrited households, the sample consists of 1,035 households: 671 NGNB beneficiaries 
and 364 that serve as the control group. We compare beneficiary and control households in Table 5.1.  
  
  9 
Table 5.1 Description of NGNB
a
 beneficiary and control households sample 
 
Unmatched sample (N=1,035) 
Description 
Control  
(N=364) 
Beneficiaries 
(N=671) Significance 
Location 
   Jalpaiguri district 0.27 0.29 
 Bankura district 0.38 0.29 *** 
Coochbehar district 0.35 0.42 ** 
High population density block
b
 0.13 0.22 *** 
Medium population density block
b
 0.37 0.31 ** 
Low population density block 0.50 0.48 
 Caste  
   Scheduled Caste
b
 0.61 0.60 
 Scheduled Tribe
b
 0.09 0.11 
 Other Backward Castes
b
 0.26 0.17 *** 
General Caste 0.04 0.12 *** 
Religion  
   Hindu
b
 0.79 0.85 ** 
Muslim 0.19 0.10 *** 
Christian 0.02 0.04 ** 
Other household characteristics 
   Household size at baseline
b
 3.94 3.84 
 Household size at midline 4.19 4.02 
 Maximum education in the household at midline
b
 5.85 5.99 
 Living with relatives at baseline
b
 0.26 0.35 ** 
Landless
b
  0.67 0.64 
 Primary income from agriculture or artisan at baseline
b
 0.36 0.36 
 Individual characteristics of female respondent 
   Age 38.99 37.00 
 Education (standard level) 1.79 37.98 
 Married 0.84 0.83 
 Single, divorced, or widowed 0.16 0.17 
 Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: a Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” b Indicates variable was included in the propensity 
score model. ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. 
Control and beneficiary households should be statistically similar for the characteristics that 
determine NGNB program eligibility, but Table 5.1 shows that they differ in characteristics such as caste 
and religion, and on factors related to their location. As a result, simply comparing outcome variables 
across the two groups of households can yield biased estimates of the NGNB program effects. To address 
this concern, and as suggested in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we analyze the determinants of NGNB 
program participation and construct a propensity score model.  
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The propensity score we estimate is the probability that an NGNB-eligible household becomes a 
beneficiary, given a set of variables related to the NGNB program eligibility criteria described by the 
Government of West Bengal: completely landless
10
 and homesteadless agricultural-laborer and artisan 
families of rural West Bengal. Results from the propensity score model allow us to form a control group 
that is, on average, observationally equivalent to the NGNB households. The characteristics that are now 
balanced include those capturing the program eligibility criteria as well as other variables that serve as 
proxies for land pressure in the block, for households’ likely demand for land, and for sociocultural 
characteristics that might affect households’ ability to take part in this program (see Appendix Table A.4 
for the propensity score model results). 
Thus, to estimate unbiased NGNB program effects on intermediate and current food security 
outcomes, we use regression analysis in which we weigh observations from NGNB households by the 
following equation as recommended by Emsley et al. (2008) and Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003): 
    
 
  
 (  )  
 
   
 (    )  (1) 
where Wh is the weight of the observation, ph is the propensity score, and Th is the treatment status of the 
household, which is equal to 1 for NGNB households and 0 for control households. 
Measuring Intermediate Outcomes and Food Security Outcomes 
Summary statistics of all the variables are presented in Table 5.2. We considered four intermediate 
outcomes that are expected to contribute to future food security: perceptions of tenure security, use of 
credit for agricultural production, investments in agricultural production, and women’s participation in 
decisionmaking. We identified between three and six indicators as proxies for these outcomes. See Table 
5.2 for a full list of these indicators with their descriptive statistics.  
We also examine household-level current food security indicators that can serve as proxies for 
households’ vulnerability to hunger, their dietary diversity, and their protein consumption. As a proxy for 
households’ vulnerability to hunger, we use a binary indicator that captures whether households reported 
experiencing times when they did not have food or money to buy food in the last three months. To capture 
dietary diversity, we use the Household Dietary Diversity Score, an indicator that summarizes the total 
number of food groups (out of a possible 12) consumed by members of the household in the last 24 hours 
(Swindale and Bilinsky 2006).
 Finally, to capture households’ protein consumption, we rely on a binary 
measure indicating whether any household member consumed protein in the last 24 hours. 
To account for the possibility that food security may vary systematically for individuals within a 
household, we constructed four additional indicators of food consumption that refer to the adult females, 
adult males, young females, and young males in the household (where adults are age 12-plus and the 
youth are age 4–11). We collected the number of full meals consumed by each household member in the 
last seven days, where full meals were previously defined by the respondent. With this information, we 
calculated the gap between the average number of full meals consumed by each demographic group (adult 
females, adult males, young females, and young males) and the most food-secure person in the 
household.
11
  
  
                                                     
10 In contrast to the definition of landless used by the National Sample Survey Organization, which is households owning 
less than 0.02 hectares of land (about 5 decimals). 
11 More precisely, the variable we used is calculated as full meals consumed by the average person in each group divided by 
the highest number of full meals consumed by any one member of the household. 
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Table 5.2 Description of outcomes and independent variables 
Description 
Dummy 
variable Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Intermediate outcomes    
Tenure security    
Woman reports being concerned that household could be asked to vacate 
the plot 
Y
a
 0.17 0.01 
Woman reports that her household will have same or more access and 
control over the plot in 5 years 
Y 0.84 0.01 
Woman reports that she will have same or more access and control over the 
plot in 5 years 
Y 0.86 0.01 
Woman reports that she could convince other decisionmakers not to sell the 
plot 
Y 0.91 0.01 
Use of credit for agricultural production    
Household has taken out a loan since 2009 Y 0.12 0.01 
Household has taken out a loan from a bank since 2009 Y 0.11 0.03 
Household used loan for agriculture Y 0.13 0.03 
Agricultural Investments    
Change in household’s livestock ownership since 2010 (tropical livestock 
units) 
 0.17 0.02 
Change in household’s productive asset ownership since 2010 
(tools/machines) 
 0.21 0.04 
Household used fertilizer (inorganic or organic) or pesticide in last year Y 0.10 0.01 
Household used seedlings, seeds, or stems in last year Y 0.11 0.01 
Household rented tools, machines, or other agricultural equipment in last 
year 
Y 0.06 0.01 
Women's Participation in Decisionmaking    
Woman respondent is a decisionmaker over:    
Whether to take loans from a Self-Help Group or microfinance institution Y 0.83 0.01 
Whether to purchase productive assets Y 0.83 0.01 
Household food purchase and consumption decisions Y 0.84 0.01 
Share of household land over which woman respondent decides:    
How to use the plot  0.77 0.02 
What to grow on the plot  0.78 0.01 
Whether to sell the produce from that plot  0.76 0.02 
Food security outcomes    
Food security  0.58 0.02 
Household Dietary Diversity Score  4.18 0.04 
Protein consumption dummy Y 0.63 0.02 
Average adult female food share  0.96 0.00 
Average adult male food share  0.96 0.00 
Average young female food share  0.97 0.00 
Average young male food share  0.97 0.01 
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Table 5.2 Continued 
Description 
Dummy 
variable Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Independent variables    
Average NGNB
b
 plot size (in decimals)  7.48 0.12 
Caste    
Other Backward Castes Y 0.23 0.01 
Scheduled Caste Y 0.61 0.02 
Scheduled Tribe Y 0.10 0.01 
General Y 0.06 0.01 
Religion    
Christian Y 0.04 0.01 
Muslim Y 0.15 0.01 
Hindu Y 0.81 0.01 
(2010) Highest education within the household (years)  5.32 0.13 
Age of female respondent  38.44 0.41 
(2012) Household size  4.13 0.06 
(2012) Number of children aged 0–3  0.25 0.02 
(2010) Number of household assets  1.32 0.02 
(2010) Number of valuable assets  0.34 0.03 
(2010) Number of productive assets  3.44 0.06 
(2010) Number of large livestock  0.16 0.02 
(2010) Number of medium livestock  0.15 0.03 
(2010) Number of small livestock  0.13 0.02 
Bankura district Y 0.33 0.02 
Coochbehar district Y 0.37 0.02 
Jalpaiguri district Y 0.29 0.02 
Source:  Authors’ computation. 
Note:  a Y = Yes. b Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” 
Stages of Program Intervention 
Our data show that implementation of the NGNB program varied beyond the selection process. NGNB 
beneficiaries interviewed for the baseline were at the same stage—they had received pattas but had not 
moved yet. However, two years later, about a quarter of them had relocated to their new plot, but the 
others had not. The qualitative evidence we gathered supports this pattern of slow transition, with many 
beneficiaries claiming that they are waiting for complementary housing and infrastructure services to be 
delivered before relocating.  
We also found that, despite the provision that pattas needed to be issued in the woman’s name 
only, or jointly for married couples, only 75 percent of the pattas issued include the woman’s name. Our 
qualitative research provides some insight into this pattern, showing a number of instances where pattas 
were allocated according to the local officials’ discretion and their understanding of each family, as well 
as instances where beneficiaries were asked whose names they would prefer to include on the titles. For 
example, in a village where households were given documents in their husbands’ names only—
conforming to social norms but not to program guidelines—officials made an exception and allocated 
land solely in the name of the woman if officials determined that the husband had “bad addiction and 
(sic) can destroy the property if he gets a chance” (married female beneficiary, focus group). Although 
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family preferences and community norms appear to play a role in how land is allocated and whether the 
allocation conforms to program guidelines, our interviews suggest that the first, and arguably stronger, 
determinant of whose names are included on the documents are the officials who ultimately choose 
whether to invite, listen to, and accept the families’ opinion. 
Recognizing that the NGNB program has not reached all beneficiaries in the same way, we 
separately explore its impact on households that have been allocated land, on households that have moved 
to their new plots, and on households in which women’s names were included on the pattas.  
Regression Equation 
We use inverse-propensity-score weighted-regression models to assess the NGNB effects on each of the 
intermediate outcomes of interest (perceptions of tenure security, use of credit for agricultural production, 
investments in agricultural production, and women’s participation in decisionmaking) as well as on the 
food security outcomes (households’ vulnerability to hunger, their dietary diversity, their protein 
consumption, and intrahousehold distribution of food).
12
 Specifically, for outcomes at the household 
level, we estimated: 
                         (2) 
where Yh is the specific outcome being tested for household h; NGNBh is a dummy indicating whether or 
not the household is an NGNB beneficiary; Xh is a vector of control variables capturing respondents’ 
caste, religion, age, households size, whether there are children under four in the household,
13
 whether the 
household owns livestock, jewelry, or other assets, and the district in which they live; and,    is the robust 
error term. We later expanded (1) to test whether the size of the plot they received matters and whether 
having a woman’s name on the document matters, as follows:  
                                           (3) 
                                                           (4) 
For the plot-level outcomes, namely those related to perceptions of tenure security, we use similar 
specifications:  
                           ; (5) 
                                                (6) 
                                                                 (7) 
where Yhp is the specific outcome being tested for household h and plot p, CDPAhp is a dummy indicating 
that the plot was obtained through the NGNB program, Xhp is a vector of control variables, and,     is the 
robust error term. 
                                                     
12 For more on inverse-propensity-score weighted regression, see Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), Emsley et al. (2008), 
and Kreif et al. (2012).  
13 This could grant the family access to the ICDS supplementary nutrition assistance. 
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6.  NGNB PROGRAM EFFECTS ON INTERMEDIATE FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES 
We summarize our findings in Table 6.1 We report marginal effects based on inverse propensity weighted 
models within the region of common support for the two rounds of data, and in parentheses we report the 
standard errors clustered by block. We chose to simplify the presentation by focusing our discussion and 
reporting only the results associated with the land-related variables of interest for this study. Full results 
from these 54 regressions are available upon request. 
The results of our analysis are very encouraging: we find statistically significant NGNB program 
effects on the four intermediate food security outcomes under consideration. This is particularly 
promising, given that most households in our sample, regardless of whether they are NGNB beneficiaries, 
had access to some land, however insecure that access might have been, and that these program effects 
are being statistically identified, despite this being a relatively recent allocation of land. 
Results from Model 1 (first column of numbers in Table 6.1) indicate that respondents perceive 
NGNB plots as more secure, that NGNB beneficiary households are more likely to access credit for 
agriculture and to invest in agricultural improvements, and that women in NGNB beneficiary households 
are more likely to participate in food and agricultural decisions.   
Controlling for the host of socioeconomic and demographic variables enumerated in the previous 
section, women report significantly higher levels of tenure security for NGNB plots than for non-NGNB 
plots. More specifically, the women interviewed are (1) 8 percent less likely to report being concerned 
about having to vacate NGNB plots; (2) 18 percent more likely to report that they expect their households 
to have retained access and control over NGNB plots five years from now, with this number dropping 
slightly, to 17 percent, when women referred to their own personal access and control; and (3) 7 percent 
more likely to report that they could convince other decisionmakers in the family not to sell the NGNB 
plot against their will. 
Similarly, households that are NGNB beneficiaries are significantly more likely to access 
financial resources from the formal system and to allocate them to agriculture. Compared with those who 
did not make it into the program, the average NGNB household is 12 percent more likely to report taking 
out a loan from a formal bank since 2009 and 88 percent more likely to use a loan for agricultural 
purposes. 
NGNB households are also more likely to invest in agriculture. During the year before the survey, 
NGNB households were (1) 11 percent more likely to have used fertilizer or pesticides; (2) 11 percent 
more likely to have used seedlings, seeds, or stems;
14
 and (3) 7 percent more likely to have rented tools, 
machines, or other agricultural equipment than eligible households that did not become NGNB 
beneficiaries. 
Finally, our results indicate that if their households are NGNB beneficiaries, women are more 
likely to be involved in important food and agriculture decisions. Compared to their non-NGNB peers, 
women in NGNB households are (1) 12 percent more likely to be involved in decisions to take loans from 
Self-Help Groups or microfinance institution; (2) 12 percent more likely to be involved in decisions on 
whether to purchase productive assets; (3) 9 percent more likely to be involved in decisions related to 
food purchase and consumption; and (4) more likely to be involved in decisions about the family land. 
The share of the family land over which they are involved in decisions increased by 15 percent for how to 
use the land, 14 percent for what to grow on it, and 11 percent for whether to sell produce from it. 
                                                     
14 This suggests that NGNB households are more likely to undertake new plantings and/or annual crops, rather than only 
caring for already existing trees and perennials. 
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Table 6.1 NGNB effects on intermediate food security outcomes 
Outcomes 
Propensity-weighted regressions 
Marginal effects at Mean 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Model 1
b 
 Model 2
b
  Model 3
b
 
NGNB
a
  NGNB
a
 
NGNB
a 
 plot 
size  NGNB
a
 
NGNB
a 
plot 
size 
Woman on 
the title 
Tenure security
c
         
Woman reports being concerned that household could be asked to vacate 
the plot 
-0.08***  0.04 -0.02***  0.06* -0.01*** -0.04*** 
(0.01)  (0.04) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) 
Woman reports that her household will have same or more access and 
control over the plot in 5 years 
0.18***  -0.00 0.03***  -0.04* 0.03*** 0.08*** 
(0.01)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Woman reports that she will have same or more access and control over the 
plot in 5 years 
0.17***  -0.01 0.03***  -0.04 0.02*** 0.10*** 
(0.01)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Woman reports that she could convince other decisionmakers not to sell the 
plot 
0.07***  0.01 0.01*  -0.01 0.01 0.03** 
(0.01)  (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Use of credit for agricultural production         
Household has taken out a loan since 2009 0.01  0.02 -0.00  0.03 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.04)  (0.06) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) 
Household has taken out a loan from a bank since 2009 0.12**  0.09** 0.00  0.07 0.00 0.02 
 (0.06)  (0.05) (0.00)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) 
Household used loan for agriculture 0.88***  0.31 0.00  0.47 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.13)  (0.43) (0.00)  (no se) (no se) (no se) 
Agricultural investments         
Change in household’s livestock ownership since 2010 (tropical livestock 
units) 
0.02  -0.07 0.01  -0.11 0.01 0.11 
(0.06)  (0.10) (0.01)  (0.09) (0.01) (0.07) 
Change in household’s productive asset ownership since 2010 
(tools/machines) 
-0.10  -0.09 -0.00  -0.07 0.00 -0.05 
(0.06)  (0.15) (0.02)  (0.16) (0.02) (0.11) 
Household used fertilizer (inorganic or organic) or pesticide in last year 0.11***  0.04 0.01*  0.05 0.01** -0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.00)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) 
Household used seedlings, seeds, or grafted stems in last year 0.11***  0.03 0.01**  0.04 0.01** -0.02 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.00)  (0.05) (0.00) (0.02) 
Household rented tools, machines, or other agricultural equipment in last 
year 
0.07***  0.03* 0.00  0.03* 0.00 -0.00 
(0.03)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
Outcomes 
Propensity-weighted regressions 
Marginal effects at Mean 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Model 1
b 
 Model 2
b
  Model 3
b
 
NGNB
a
  NGNB
a
 
NGNB
a 
 plot 
size  NGNB
a
 
NGNB
a 
plot 
size 
Woman on 
the title 
Women's participation in decisionmaking         
Woman respondent is a decisionmaker over:         
Whether to take loans from an Self-Help Group or microfinance institution 0.12***  0.10* 0.00  0.05 -0.00 0.14*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Whether to purchase productive assets 0.12***  0.01** 0.00  0.04 -0.01 0.15*** 
 (0.03)  (0.05) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Household food purchase and consumption decisions 0.09***  0.07* 0.00  0.03 -0.00 0.13*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) 
Share of household land over which woman respondent decides:         
How to use the plot 0.15***  0.12** 0.00  0.07 -0.00 0.13* 
 (0.04)  (0.05) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) 
What to grow on the plot 0.14**  0.16*** -0.00  0.10* -0.01 0.15** 
 (0.06)  (0.05) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) 
Whether to sell the produce from that plot 0.11*  0.05 0.01  -0.02 -0.00 0.17** 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.01)  (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: a Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” b Other control variables not shown. c Tenure security regressions were estimated at the plot level.  
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.
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In an attempt to understand some of the factors underlying these results, we ran two additional 
sets of regressions. First, we explored whether the size of the allocated plot matters—an important 
question, given the scarcity and cost of land in this region. To do this we expanded the model to include a 
variable that captures the size of the NGNB plot, as specified in equations (3) and (6). This allows us to 
distinguish benefits in tenure security, agricultural finance and investments, and women’s decisionmaking 
that stem from being an NGNB beneficiary and receiving a documented plot of land, regardless of the 
size of this plot, from benefits that are sensitive to the plot’s size. Results from this second model are 
reported under Model 2 in Table 6.1.  
Of particular relevance to those involved in designing, funding, and implementing land-allocation 
programs, we find that the tenure-security benefits associated with the NGNB program and the increase in 
the use of fertilizers, pesticides, seedlings, seeds, or stems by NGNB beneficiary households do vary with 
the size of the plot. To put it simply, on average, respondents perceived NGNB plots as more secure than 
non-NGNB plots, but this gap in tenure security gets larger as the plot size increases—with tenure 
security improving 1 percent per decimal of land allocated (see the first 4 rows, column 3 of Table 6.1). 
This means that although the gap in tenure security between NGNB and non-NGNB plots is almost 
negligible when plots are 1 or 2 decimals in size, NGNB beneficiaries who received plots of 10 decimals 
can experience between a 10-percent and 30-percent improvement in their perceptions of tenure security. 
Similarly, the 1-percent marginal effect associated with the size of the NGNB plot when explaining 
households’ use of fertilizers, pesticides, seedlings, seeds, or grafted stems (rows 3 and 4 under 
Agricultural Investments, column 3) suggests a 10-percent increase in households’ investments in these 
agricultural inputs if the NGNB plot is 10 decimals in size, but almost none for plots that are only 2 
decimals.  
Lastly, to test whether including women’s names on the pattas—an important directive of the 
NGNB program—yielded some of the expected results, we ran a third set of regressions described by 
equations (4) and (7) that include an additional dummy variable indicating whether the woman’s name 
had been included. These results are listed under Model 3 (columns 4, 5, and 6 on Table 6.1). We find 
that including women’s names on the pattas matters—it significantly contributes to women’s perceptions 
of increased tenure security and to women’s involvement in food and agriculture decisionmaking. 
Women’s report on tenure security outcomes improves up to 10 percent when their names are included on 
the land documents (rows 1 to 4 under Tenure Security, column 6). When their names are on the pattas, 
women are 14 percent, 15 percent, and 13 percent more likely to participate in decisions about taking 
loans, purchasing productive assets, and food purchasing and consumption, respectively. Finally, women 
with land documents under their name have a say over a larger share of their households’ land when it 
comes to decisions on how to use the land, what to grow on it, and whether to sell the produce from that 
plot (rows under Women’s Participation in Decisionmaking, column 6). 
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7.  NGNB PROGRAM EFFECTS ON CURRENT FOOD SECURITY 
Results from our qualitative research suggest that land is seen as an important way to offset cash 
expenditure on food purchases.  
Yes, there are many families with small piece of lands like 1 or 2 bighas [1 bigha is 
approximately 1/3 acre], which is not enough to grow food for the whole year. They are 
poor too. But we are the poorest, we do not have any cultivable land at all. Whatever we 
eat, we need to buy those.—Female qualified nonbeneficiary, focus group 
The link between land and food security appears to be most relevant for women because of their 
limited mobility and outside cash-earning opportunities. Land, in addition to children, was seen as a 
source of social security for widows or women in old age.  
Having land in my own name is even more supportive than having sons. Sons will look 
after me as long as they are not married, but if I plant a tree in my land and take care of 
[it], that will give me money for purchasing food and medicines when needed in my old 
age.—Female beneficiary, life history, age 37 
However, as the results in Table 7.1 suggest, at this point in time we are unable to identify 
statistically significant NGNB effects on households’ current food security. On average, households that 
are eligible for the program are just as likely to be food secure regardless of whether they became 
program beneficiaries (row 1, column 1 of Table 7.1). Since, arguably, the expected food security benefits 
would not materialize until households have relocated to their new plots and have had the opportunity to 
settle and adjust their livelihoods, we repeated the analysis, this time limiting the “beneficiary” category 
to households that had moved to their NGNB plot at least six months prior to the survey. We find no 
significant improvements in their food security (row 1, column 2 of Table 7.1). Finally, because the 
results described in the previous section indicated that women were in a stronger decisionmaking position 
when their names were on the land titles, and women tend to play a key role in their families’ food 
security, we also checked whether including women’s names on the pattas made a difference (Model 3, 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.1). According to our results, this measure has yet to yield a 
significant impact on food security (row 1, column 4). 
We repeated the same analysis to explore whether the program made a difference in the diversity 
of their diet (second row), their consumption of proteins (third row), and how food was allocated within 
the family (rows 4 to 7). There was no statistical difference in any of these cases, either.  
Two factors might contribute to these results. First, not enough time has passed for the food 
security outcomes to materialize—therefore we identify intermediate effects that are expected to improve 
future food security, but cannot identify an impact on current food security. Although our data indicate 
that, on average, 29 months have passed since demarcation, suggesting ample time to plant, our 
qualitative research highlighted the fact that the parcels allocated were often of marginal quality. Many 
beneficiaries recounted the need to amend their soil and infill and level their new plots before the yard 
was cultivable. Second, not enough beneficiary households have moved. NGNB’s expected effects are 
predicated on households relocating to the plot and cultivating a backyard garden, but only 25 percent of 
the beneficiaries in our sample have moved.  
Full regression results, included in Appendix Table A.5, suggest additional patterns affecting the 
food security of households eligible for the NGNB. In particular, Muslim households appear to be more 
vulnerable to food scarcity than their Hindu peers; households with more valuable assets or with large- 
and medium-size livestock are more likely to be food secure; Scheduled Tribe households are less likely 
to consume proteins; and households with a larger number of young children appear to have a more 
diverse diet, perhaps because they qualify for food programs. 
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Table 7.1 NGNB effects on food security outcomes 
 Propensity-weighted regressions 
Marginal effects at mean 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Model 1
a
 Model 2
a
  Model 3
a
 
 NGNB
b
  
Moved to 
NGNB
b
 plot
c
   
Moved to 
NGNB
b
 plot
c
 
Woman’s name 
on the title 
Food security indicators (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Food security -0.07 -0.05  -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.08) 
Household Dietary Diversity Score -0.100 0.16  0.19 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.10) 
Protein consumption -0.05 0.01  0.04 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Intrahousehold distribution of food 
(shares are relative to the family 
member with highest consumption) 
     
Average adult female food share  -0.01 -0.01  -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Average adult male food share  -0.01 -0.02  -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Average young female food share  -0.02 0.00  0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Average young male food share  -0.01 -0.02  -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: a Other control variables not shown. b Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” 
cAcknowledging that it would take time for families to settle and observe food-related changes, this variable is defined 
as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the family relocated to their NGNB plot at least six months before they were 
interviewed. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
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8.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our results suggest that although current food security might not have improved yet, the West Bengal 
NGNB land-allocation program has led to significant and positive impacts on outcomes that are expected 
to lay the foundation for future food security, both at the household and individual levels. More 
specifically, women perceive higher tenure security over NGNB plots, and NGNB households are more 
likely to access credit for agriculture, more likely to invest in agriculture, and more likely to use improved 
inputs—actions that are likely to lead to increased food production. This is similar to the findings of Li, 
Rozelle, and Brandt (1998), who reported that the short-term investments in land did not change with 
improved land-tenure security, but that long-term investments in land did.  
Although resource constraints will strongly and undoubtedly encourage policymakers and 
program implementers to consider allocating very small plots, it is important that our study argues that the 
size of the plot matters. Even though our data do not allow us to predict the optimal plot size, our study 
provides evidence that the larger the plot, the stronger the program impacts. 
Furthermore, the program’s emphasis on allocating land jointly and including women’s names on 
pattas has already yielded some of its expected benefits: women whose names are on a patta reported 
significant improvements in tenure security and were significantly more likely to report being active 
participants in family decisions, outcomes that are expected to improve household and intrahousehold 
food security. This is in alignment with results found by previous literature focusing on gender and tenure 
security, most notably Allendorf (2007). It is worth noting that these positive and significant impacts of 
naming women on the land documents do not hinge on whether their households have relocated to the 
new plots.  
Given that homestead development requires the convergence of other government services (roads, 
water, extension work, seeds, and so forth) as well as household investments that may take time to bear 
results, a full assessment of the program’s impact would benefit from additional data gathered after one or 
two more years have passed. In addition, taking advantage of the variation in program implementation, 
researchers could examine what aspects worked well and identify best practices that can be put in place as 
the program is scaled up. Furthermore, given the government’s recognition of the importance of ensuring 
that women in beneficiary households are fully included, it will be helpful to explore which processes and 
decisions resulted in 25 percent of the pattas not including a woman’s name and why. Although we 
recommend further analysis of the questions outlined above, we believe the findings presented in this 
study are of immediate relevance to the Indian government, which is currently weighing a national 
Homestead Act and laying plans for strategies to address food security.  
Our findings suggest that (1) homestead development programs can lay the foundation for long-
term food security; (2) although microplots can enhance livelihoods, their potential benefits increase with 
the size of the plot and might be negligible if the plots are too small; (3) including women’s names on the 
land documents can improve women’s tenure security and their ability to influence household decisions; 
(4) due to the longer-term nature of this type of intervention, the government should consider pairing 
homestead development programs with complementary food distribution programs that ensure that 
immediate food and nutritional needs are met while the benefits of the homestead development programs 
mature and materialize; and (5) because a considerable number of the NGNB beneficiaries surveyed have 
not yet moved, it is important that homestead development programs proactively address concurrent 
financial constraints or lack of available housing to enable families to fully benefit and leverage the 
allocated plots. 
As public and civil society actors in India continue to grapple with food security challenges, they 
must recognize and embrace the fact that these problems are complex and that addressing them requires 
integrated approaches that, at a minimum, combine strengthening land rights with adequate access to 
financial services, housing, extension services, and infrastructure support. We argue that a one-time, 
integrated, and well-executed homestead allocation and development program can lay the foundation for 
household and individual food security.  
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APPENDIX:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1 Categorizations of qualitative interviews 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Notes: The pradhan is the head of the gram panchayat, the most local unit of self-government in West Bengal. The 
Karmadhakshya is the head of the standing committee at the zilla parishad, the district-level unit of West Bengal self-
government. 
Table A.2 T-tests for differences in means in baseline for attritors versus nonattritors 
 Nonattritors 
(N=1,035) 
Attritors 
(N=338) 
Significance  Mean Mean 
District     
Jalpaiguri 0.27 0.23  
Bankura 0.35 0.22 *** 
Coochbehar 0.38 0.53 *** 
Household characteristics    
Household size 3.59 3.13 *** 
Number of working members 1.67 1.53 *** 
Number of rooms in house 1.71 1.61  
Owns any livestock 0.32 0.33  
Income earned locally 3,258.27 2,436.26  
Household member works out of district 0.10 0.11  
Household member working in an agriculture or artisan trade 0.50 0.51  
Self-Help group member 0.18 0.13 ** 
Claims to be landowner 0.34 0.28  
Respondent characteristics    
Age of male respondent 44.17 42.08 * 
Education of male respondent (standard level) 2.42 2.27  
Male respondent is married 0.92 0.75 *** 
Age of female respondent 37.30 37.09  
Education of female respondent (standard level) 1.36 2.05 *** 
Female respondent is married 0.88 0.84  
Age of marriage of female respondent 15.94 16.06  
Food security    
Experienced times with no food in past 3 months 0.52 0.48  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: * Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
Key informants Life histories Focus groups 
 Pradhan (4) 
 Karmadhakshya (1) 
 Revenue inspector (2) 
 Block development officer (2) 
 Block land and land reforms 
officer (2) 
 District manager (1) 
 Single woman household (3) 
 Men (2) 
 Muslim women (2) 
 Scheduled/Backward Caste 
women (2) 
 Female headed household (1) 
 General Caste woman (1) 
 Beneficiary married women (3) 
 Beneficiary married men (2) 
 Qualified, nonbeneficiary women (2) 
 Female heads of household (1) 
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Table A.3 Attrition probit for food security outcomes 
 Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Household characteristics   
Caste   
Scheduled Caste -1.34 0.20*** 
Scheduled Tribe -0.80 0.26*** 
Other Backward Castes -2.33 0.53*** 
Minority -0.93 0.26*** 
Religion   
Muslim 0.28 0.24 
Christian -0.36 0.40 
Other -0.79 0.38** 
Household size -0.08 0.04* 
Number of working members 0.01 0.12 
Age of male respondent -0.01 0.01 
Age of female respondent -0.01 0.01 
Education of male respondent -0.03 0.02 
Education of female respondent 0.01 0.03 
(Related to) Asset ownership   
Owns livestock 0.15 0.15 
Number of rooms in the current house -0.08 0.09 
Location   
Coochbehar 0.13 0.19 
Jalpaiguri -0.74 0.23** 
Lagged value of the main dependent variable   
Food insecure 0.26 0.15 
Number of observations 754  
Pseudo R2 0.14  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: * Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
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Table A.4 Propensity score model: NGNB participation 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
NGNB
a
 eligibility criteria   
Primary income from agriculture or artisan 0.03 0.15 
Landless -0.07 0.15 
Land scarcity   
Medium population density block -0.17 0.17 
High population density block 0.51 0.21** 
Household pressured for land   
Living with relatives 0.46 0.16 *** 
Household size -0.03 0.05 
Expressed concerned about eviction -0.09 0.14 
Household characteristics   
Maximum education in the household 0.01 0.02 
Caste   
Scheduled Caste -1.23 0.29 *** 
Scheduled Tribe -1.01 0.34 *** 
Other Backward Castes -1.81 0.47 *** 
Religion: Hindu -0.15 0.42 
Constant 0.63 0.57 
Number of observations 1,035 
Pseudo R2 0.04 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: * Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. a Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My 
Home, My Land.”
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Table A.5 NGNB program effects on household-level direct food security outcomes: Full results 
 Propensity-weighted regressions 
Marginal effects at Mean (Robust Standard Error) 
 Food Security  Household Dietary Diversity Score  Protein 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NGNB
a 
 beneficiary -0.070    -0.095    -0.047   
 (0.07)    (0.08)    (0.06)   
Household has moved to the NGNB
a 
 plot  -0.046 -0.015   0.162 0.190   0.006 0.042 
  (0.06) (0.07)   (0.16) (0.17)   (0.06) (0.06) 
Woman's name on the NGNB
a 
 title   -0.063    -0.056    -0.070 
   (0.08)    (0.10)    (0.06) 
Caste            
Other Backward Classes -0.181 -0.176 -0.173  -0.208 -0.204 -0.201  -0.002 0.000 0.004 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Scheduled Caste 0.083 0.086 0.082  -0.134 -0.131 -0.135  -0.036 -0.035 -0.039 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Scheduled Tribe -0.063 -0.059 -0.062  -0.274 -0.277 -0.279  -0.157 -0.156 -0.159 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Religion            
Christian 0.080 0.084 0.076  -0.257 -0.380 -0.387  -0.024 -0.043 -0.053 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Muslim 0.290*** 0.293*** 0.286***  -0.191 -0.180 -0.190  -0.038 -0.034 -0.046 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
(2010) Highest education in household (years) 0.011 0.011 0.011  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005  0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of female respondent -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.006 -0.005 -0.006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(2012) Household size 0.005 0.004 0.004  0.044 0.042 0.042  0.019 0.018 0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
(2012) Number of children aged 0–3 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010  0.258** 0.259*** 0.261**  0.042 0.041 0.043 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
(2010) Number of household assets -0.032 -0.031 -0.032  -0.014 -0.015 -0.016  0.034 0.035 0.034 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
(2010) Number of valuable assets 0.042* 0.043* 0.044*  0.155*** 0.154*** 0.155***  0.033 0.034 0.034 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
(2010) Number of productive assets -0.003 -0.001 -0.002  -0.016 -0.010 -0.011  -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(2010) Number of large livestock -0.019 -0.017 -0.019  0.172* 0.176* 0.175*  0.026 0.027 0.026 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
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Table A.5 Continued 
 Propensity-weighted regressions 
Marginal effects at Mean (Robust Standard Error) 
 Food Security  Household Dietary Diversity Score  Protein 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(2010) Number of medium livestock 0.008 0.010 0.008  0.028 0.028 0.026  0.047*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(2010) Number of small livestock -0.009 -0.009 -0.008  -0.091** -0.093** -0.092**  -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Coochbehar district -0.072 -0.066 -0.080  0.179 0.143 0.130  -0.062 -0.066 -0.082 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Jalpaiguri district 0.036 0.039 0.027  0.028 0.007 -0.003  -0.065 -0.067 -0.080 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant     4.347*** 4.279*** 4.312***  0.714*** 0.684*** 0.725*** 
     (0.28) (0.30) (0.28)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Number of Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032  1,032 1,032 1,032  1,032 1,032 1,032 
(pseudo) R-square 0.035 0.033 0.035  0.074 0.074 0.075  0.035 0.033 0.037 
Source:  Authors’ computation. 
Notes: * Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. a Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” 
Table A.6 NGNB program effects on individual direct food security outcomes 
 Propensity-weighted regressions 
 Marginal effects at Mean (Robust Standard Error) 
 Adult female  Adult male  Young female  Young male 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NGNB
a
 beneficiary –0.006    –0.007    –0.017    –0.007   
 (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
Household has moved to the 
NGNB
a
 plot 
 –0.007 –0.004   –0.020 –0.016   0.005 0.014   –0.018 –0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.02) 
Woman's name on the NGNB
a
 
title 
  –0.006    –0.008    –0.017    –0.015 
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.01) 
Caste                
Other Backward Classes –0.009 –0.009 –0.008  –0.012 –0.012 –0.011  –0.018 –0.023* –0.017  –0.051** –0.049** –0.048** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Scheduled Caste –0.003 –0.003 –0.003  –0.007 –0.008 –0.008  –0.027*** –0.027*** –0.026**  –0.021 –0.022 –0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Scheduled Tribe –0.002 –0.001 –0.001  –0.003 –0.003 –0.003  –0.009 –0.009 –0.011  –0.019 –0.018 –0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Religion                
Christian –0.030 –0.028 –0.029  –0.055** –0.046** –0.047**  0.006 0.003 –0.000  0.042* 0.049 0.050 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Muslim –0.012 –0.012 –0.013  –0.006 –0.006 –0.007  –0.002 0.004 –0.003  0.030** 0.029** 0.029** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Table A.6 Continued 
 Propensity-weighted regressions 
 Marginal effects at Mean 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
 Adult female  Adult male  Young female  Young male 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(2010) Highest education in 
household (years) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.002 0.002  –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age of female respondent 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001* 0.001* 0.001  –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(2012) Household size –0.007 –0.007 –0.007  –0.005 –0.005 –0.005  0.003 0.002 0.003  –0.010* –0.010* –0.010* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(2012) Number of children 
aged 0–3 
–0.020* –0.020* –0.020*  –0.020 –0.021 –0.021  –0.012 –0.013 –0.013  –0.026 –0.026 –0.024 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
(2010) Number of household 
assets 
–0.006 –0.006 –0.006  –0.006 –0.006 –0.006  –0.002 –0.001 –0.002  0.009 0.009 0.099 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(2010) Number of valuable 
assets 
0.002 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.002 0.002  –0.005 –0.003 –0.004  –0.006 –0.005 –0.005 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(2010) Number of productive 
assets 
0.000 0.000 0.000  –0.003 –0.004 –0.008*  –0.007* –0.007* –0.007*  0.004 0.004 0.004 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 (2010) Number of large 
livestock 
–0.003 –0.003 –0.003  –0.001 –0.001 –0.001  –0.003 –0.004 –0.004  0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(2010) Number of medium 
livestock 
–0.001 –0.001 –0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.004 0.004 0.004  0.008** 0.008* 0.008* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(2010) Number of small 
livestock 
0.004 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.004* 0.005*  0.008** 0.009** 0.008**  0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Coochbehar district –0.012 –0.011 –0.012  –0.014 –0.011 –0.013  –0.039** –0.042** –0.045***  –0.006 –0.003 –0.006 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Jalpaiguri district 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030**  0.021 0.023* 0.022  0.014 0.014 0.012  0.040** 0.041** 0.038** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 1.000*** 0.996*** 1.000***  0.997*** 0.994*** 0.998***  0.994*** 0.986*** 0.993***  1.020*** 1.017*** 1.025*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Number of observations 1,032 1,032 1,032  955 955 955  299 299 299  306 306 306 
R-square 0.104 0.104 0.105  0.086 0.089 0.091  0.159 0.149 0.157  0.119 0.122 0.127 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Notes: a Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi, which translates to “My Home, My Land.” * Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
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